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We know that nothing kills a nigger like too much love.
-Julius Lester, Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your
Mamafl
I. THE SOUL OF THE MOVEMENT
What has happened to the civil rights movement? Just a quarter of a
century ago, the spiritual and moral courage of civil rights leaders touched
the conscience of a nation, which watched while peaceful protesters were
beaten and small children were blown to bits. The images demolished the
mythology that the system of racial segregation had any relationship to the
preservation of civilization and brought about an avalanche of federal and
state initiatives aimed at eradicating discrimination. Some of them-the
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, to take two prominent examples-worked rad-
ical transformations in the fabric of American society. The air was rich
with a sense of confidence, and triumph, and loving sacrifice.
But something has happened. The civil rights movement, if it still exists
at all, has lost its ascendancy among American social movements. It has
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1. J. Lester, Look Out Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama! 107 (1968).
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lost energy, lost purpose, lost popularity. Something has gone terribly
wrong, and everybody has a story about what it is. Most of the stories are
ideological. For critics from the right, the movement is said to have lost its
spiritual moorings, to have sacrificed the glowing principle of color-blind-
ness on the altar of racial preferences.a Critics from the left, in one of
those fascinating ironies that drive liberal centrists half mad, offer a sym-
metrical assessment: the civil rights movement has lost ground because it
has pressed for more than the society is ready to give.8
Julius Lester offers a different and quite tantalizing theory. For Lester,
the trouble in the contemporary civil rights movement has little to do with
its goal, and a good deal to do with its soul. The problem, he says, is that
black leaders have tried to appropriate suffering as something unique to
the experience of black Americans. This explains why black leaders often
seem to see their task as reminding the larger society that it has profited
from the exploitation of racial minorities, and then crying racism when
the society's sense of guilt proves evanescent or non-existent. In Lester's
view, the civil rights movement will not recover its spiritual greatness or
its momentum until the leadership of the black community once again
preaches to the oppressed that only the inner moral progress of suffering
individuals moves the conscience of the society around them.
This is what I take to be the subtext of Lovesong, Julius Lester's
warm, witty, yet sharply outspoken recounting of his journey toward Ju-
daism.· I would not contend that the story I have read is the one that the
author decided consciously to tell, but as I reflect on a book I first picked
up nearly a year ago, I am quite certain that the subtext is there. On the
surface, Lester's is a tale in part of wonder, in part of joy, in part of
tragedy. The wonder comes in the opposition of two Julius Lesters. One
of them, twenty years ago, stood accused of anti-Semitism, and Lester is
the first to admit that the criticism was not wholly without merit. The
other Lester today is Jewish, finally at peace with himself after a life-long
spiritual odyssey.a The joy comes in his recounting of his struggle toward
2. The classic statement is perhaps this one by Alexander Bickel:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history
have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is
to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a
matter of whose ox is gored.
A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975). See also N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination
(1975); Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale L.J. 995 (1984).
3. For example, one critic has recently concluded that the vision of antidiscrimination as inconsis-
tent with broad group-based remedies "seeks to proscribe only certain kinds of subordinating acts, and
then only when other interests are not overly burdened." Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1342
(1988). See also D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (1987);
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique
96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
4. J. Lester, Lovesong: Becoming a Jew (1988) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
5. As it happens, one of Lester's great-grandparents was a Jewish man who married an ex-slave,
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his faith which, in the end, he discovers and embraces with a passion that
he had not known was in him. The tragedy comes in the way that he has
been made to suffer in the course .of his odyssey. Unfortunately, this
troubling, triumphant story possesses as many elements of tragedy as of
comedy, and its ending, in which the author discovers his faith and em-
braces it in love, leaves a faintly bitter aftertaste.
Lovesong should have been a happier book. After reading it, one cannot
help but be saddened, not simply because Julius Lester has suffered, but
because the suffering has so marked him. A tale of a spiritual and intellec-
tual odyssey away from home and back again should be an occasion for
joy, for the journey is one that many of us attempt and few of us
complete.
Despite his personal and spiritual triumph, and despite all of his admi-
rable efforts to meet adversity with love, Julius Lester is obviously a bitter
man, perhaps with reason. His narrative sparkles when he writes of his
childhood, or of his love of God and of his faith, but it drips venom when
he describes his colleagues at the University of Massachusetts at Am-
herst-at least the black ones-and Jesse Jackson and a host of other
icons of the contemporary black community. None of these people, in his
judgment, understands Judaism; none wants to take the trouble to know
what it is to be a Jew.
This is where the book acquires its bittersweet aspect, for Lester's
story, which is moving when read as straightforward autobiography and
depressing when read as an allegory on the civil rights movement, is also a
tale of anti-Semitism and intolerance, subjects on which Lester himself
can speak with some expertise. The way in which Lester has been made
to suffer marks the book, and the resulting account is sometimes venomous
in its disparagement of the author's enemies. All too often, the reader
must cut through a truly passionate anger that mars what is otherwise a
very fine and poignant narrative.
And yet one does not want to be too quick to question the tone, because
there is a sense in which events have vindicated Lester's controversial crit-
icism. In the year since Lovesong was published, he has been drummed
out of the Afro-American Studies Department at the University of Massa-
chusetts at Amherst-evidently in response to his views-and even though
the Judaic and Near Eastern Studies Department welcomed him, the
threat to academic freedom is palpable and, to black intellectuals, should
be chillingly familiar. Thus it seems appropriate to reflect on Lovesong a
year later, both by rehearsing the story and its message, and by consider-
ing the link between its message and the way in which too many in the
but to call that the "reason" for his conversion would trivialize the narrative force of the book-length
explanation that he offers.
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black community have chosen to isolate dissenters from the community's
orthodoxy.
II. THE STORY AND THE METAPHOR
As a child growing up in Arkansas, Julius Lester says, he did not iden-
tify with any of the heroes in the pantheon of great black Americans:
Robeson, Dubois, Washington, Carver, Bethune and the rest. He saw
himself instead as Shylock in The Merchant of Venice. He suggests an
explanation: Those great black Americans "are models of success,"
whereas the young Julius Lester needed "a model of suffering." And then
he suggests another: Perhaps "through Shylock I learn that blacks are not
the only people in the world who must ponder in their flesh the meaning
of meaningless suffering."8
For the mature Professor Lester this memory is a symbol, as are some
other early instances of doubt about the tenets of the Christianity that he
learned from his domineering father, a clergyman, especially about the
divinity of Jesus (a doubt carefully hidden from his father). They symbol-
ize the possibility that he has been chosen by God to be different7j that his
destiny might not lie along the Protestant Christian path followed by so
many black families for generations, especially in the South.
Also lurking here is a criticism, however indirect and tactful, of some-
thing that the civil rights movement tends to do, especially now. In sug-
gesting that only in Shylock was he able to find a model of suffering,
Lester implicitly challenges the notion that black people have suffered as a
people in some special manner that touches everyone who is black and no
one else-a notion that undergirds all manner of prescriptions for curing
social ills. For if we who are black have suffered like no other people in
history, then quite naturally (so the modern argument seems to run) we
deserve to be the beneficiaries of a system of protections and preferences
like no other in history.
To deny this proposition is to deny the validity of a substantial part of
the racial critique of American law and history.. "When a man has
emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state," the Supreme Court de-
clared in The Civil Rights Cases a century ago, "there must be some stage
in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen,
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws."8 These words have come
to stand for racist insensitivity. According to what might be called the
racial critique of law and history, black people never were the special
favorites of the laws, except when the laws have favored them with op-
6. P.22.
7. P. 19.
8. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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pression, and the oppression with which black people have long been fa-
vored is the root cause of most of the problems that bedevil the black
community today.9 Racial preferences are most often justified by reference
to this history.
One would almost have to be willfully blind to deny that many of the
problems of black people in contemporary America are related to a history
of vicious racial subjugation. But of course, other people have suffered too,
sometimes on account of color, sometimes for other reasons. The usually
unspoken suggestion inherent in the construction of special programs to
remove the legacy of history is that black people (and perhaps some other
people of color) have suffered in ways that other people have not-for
only a unique suffering can demand so unique a remedy.
But in the opening pages of Lovesong, Julius Lester challenges the case
for black uniqueness, suggesting a truth at variance with civil rights or-
thodoxy: True, you (we) have never been the special favorites of the laws;
but you (we) should also not seek to be that. For you (we) are not alone
in your (our) suffering. Others have suffered, and others have persevered.
Do not insist on the uniqueness of your (our) suffering. Instead, you (we)
should seek to make common cause with others who have suffered. Early
in the book, this is a hint; later on, it will explode into a fulmination
against what, in his view, the civil rights movement has become.
To Lester, the commonality of suffering is no recent discovery.
Lovesong is full of examples of his early concern that black people not
exclude the possibility of sharing the suffering of others-even if we have
only the author's word that these were his feelings. When he goes to
speak at Berea College in 1969, for example, he is literally surrounded by
the black students and becomes, he says, "a prisoner of the black collec-
tive."lo And there is more:
At dinner, the black students sit at separate tables in the center of
the dining hall, me in their midst like a prize orchid they have bred.
I am angry at myself for not asking some of the white students look- .
ing fearfully at us from the surrounding tables to join us. They are
Southerners, too, and I share a history and an agony with them, too,
and want to talk about it. I do nothing.n
In Lester's view, evidently, the black students whose captive he is would
deny any commonality between their suffering and the suffering of the
white students. It should not be surprising that the students assumed that
Lester would join them in their lonely solidarity. In the late sixties, Julius
Lester was what was then called a black activist, capable of authoring
9. Perhaps the pre-eminent exponent of this critique is Derrick Bell. See, e.g., D. Bell, Race,
Racism, and American Law (1973); D. Bell, supra note 3.
10. P. 66.
11. [d.
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Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama! a book that
frightened some people and offended many more. The late sixties were an
angry and frightening time in the civil rights movement, not only because
of the rhetoric of the age, but also because of the violent action and reac-
tion in the streets.
Lester says now that Look Out, Whitey! was supposed to be funny, and
while he admits that it was also angry, the anger, he says, is of a special
kind: "not the deadly ire which seeks to kill, but the anger of love that
mocks and pokes fun at whites."u Plainly, the reviewers who made him
the pre-eminent spokesman for the Black Power movement understood
Lester as little as the students who made him captive did:
To be seen as the personal emissary of Black Power, a "militant,"
is confusing, distressing and downright embarrassing.· I doubt that
militants go to the Brasserie as often as possible for its superb
caviar-and-sour-cream omelet, or stay up until four-thirty in the
morning to watch a Bette Davis movie on the late show, or until
6:00 a.m. listening to Bill Watson on WNCN reading from Thucyd-
ides' Peloponnesian War. Not only am I not a "militant," I'm not
even political, even if I am involved in a political movement. (Eating
Chinese food with chopsticks doesn't make me Chinese.) Writing po-
litically is a function of Mind. Mind is not me. How can others not
know that?18
He was in an odd position, a favorite militant of the media who did not fit
the image-in part because he sympathized too much with the enemy, and
not only at Berea:
I am aware that in public appearances and on my radio show I
am not living up to people's expectations. I do not have a ten-foot-
high Afro and don't eat white people for breakfast-without sugar. I
scarcely raise my voice above conversational level, and prefer to joke
and laugh rather than prophesy doom as a latter-day Savonarola. I
sympathize with white college students who come to hear me; they
expect to be called honkies and to be made to lie prostrate with guilt
for all of white America's sins, and are pathetically grateful when I
speak to them as human beings deserving respect. I ache for the
black students who need me to be their whip, flaying white flesh for
sins, real and imagined. I can't do it, and often after I speak I am
surrounded by white students eager to talk with me while the disap-
pointed black ones drift sullenly away.l.
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to tell the good guys from the bad guys with quite the ease of some of his
contemporaries.
Today, Lester the caviar-eating militant has become Lester the dissent-
ing intellectual. He is a tenured professor at a major university, author of
a dozen or so books, and he still has the same problem today that he did
in the sixties: he is still unable to tell the good guys from the bad guys
with ease. In fact, he seems less certain than before that the category of
"bad guy" is very important in everday life. And he continues to insist, as
he did two decades ago, that suffering should bring people together, not
push them apart. He argues in particular that black people err in assum-
ing that no one else can possibly understand what it means to be black,
and what it means to have suffered as black folk have. To Lester the
commonality of suffering is virtually a self-evident truth. Throughout the
book, he recounts the difficulties that have arisen, not simply from trying
to convince others (other black people, that is) of this truth-but even in
getting them to listen to it. For the unhappy truth is that too much has
been allowed for too long to turn on whether or not the suffering of black
people is unique.
To see why this must be so, consider the matter the other way around:
if all people who have suffered have suffered in essentially similar ways,
then it is difficult to explain why some sufferers should, in law, be treated
differently than others. Perhaps others who have suffered the predations
of racial oppression might be admitted to share in the uniqueness-but no
one else. Special treatment for everyone, after all, means special treatment
for no one. III Everything from minority set-aside programsI6 to political
solidarity rests in some way on the claim of uniqueness. Thus it ought to
be unsurprising that many black people find the notion of commonality of
suffering to be profoundly threatening. If we lose our claim to have suf-
fered in ways that are unique in history (so the fear must run), then how
much else of our hard-won political ground will we have to surrender?
The claim that the suffering of black folk is unique grounds much of
the current civil rights orthodoxy. We have been dragged here unwillingly
on slave ships, our culture has been forcibly abolished, our education pro-
hibited in one century and inferior in the next, our general unfitness for
the ordinary occupations of life drummed into us relentlessly for centuries,
so that we have very nearly been destroyed as a people. We are society's
15. Harold Cruse, among others, has criticized the society's willingness to address the concerns of
women along with or ahead of the concerns of black people, notwithstanding what he insists are
important distinctions between the ways in which the two groups have suffered. H. Cruse, Plural but
Equal: Blacks and Minorities in America's Plural Society 363-369 (1987).
16. At least when created by a local rather than national government, set-aside programs created
in the absence of a clear record of discrimination must now be deemed constitutionally suspect. Com-
pare City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (striking down set-aside program
adopted by Richmond City Council) with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (sustaining set-
aside program adopted by the Congress). See generally Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L.J 543 (1987).
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vIctIms. Consequently, racial preferences and other special programs are
described as payment for a debt that society owes us, and whether society
pays out of guilt or out of simple justice, pay it must, because we have
been wronged like no people before.
To expunge the debt, the argument runs, the society must recognize our
claim on a share of such scarce resources as jobs with real prospects of
advancement and education in the most selective programs of the best pro-
fessional schools. The underlying assumption is that the problems that the
rest of the world has caused are problems that the rest of the world must
solve. Life may be unfair, and, in Thomas Sowell's sensible aphorism,
tests may measure the results, but those are only interim results; the world
that has caused the unfairness must come back later and adjust the scores.
This claim of uniqueness takes the majority's historical insistence on
the difference between black and white and tries to make it work the other
way. Once upon a time, the nation justified its oppression of us on the
ground that we were different than they. It is easy to make it a crime to
teach a black person to read once you are prepared to concede that it is
not possible to do so. Well, fine, the argument concludes. You treated us
as different then; you will choke on those differences now..
Of course, the idea of difference is more than a rallying cry. It is also a
critique of accepted understandings, a demand for a share in the interpre-
tation of the world. It says, "We matter. Our oppression makes our world
different from yours and our world matters. That difference matters. Our
oppression makes our voice different from yours. That voice matters."
The idea of difference, and its importance, has been worked out more
fully by feminist scholars than by those propounding what might be called
the racial critique.17 Most prominent is perhaps the controversial work of
Carol Gilligan, who contends that from early childhood, males and fe-
males evidence markedly different forms of moral reasoning.18 Gilligan
has her critics, including psychologists who have questioned her methodol-
ogy or who have conducted independent studies that throw some doubt on
her results. Ie Other critics are fearful of the uses to which their opponents
17. For a legal scholar's useful overview of the difference literature, with an emphasis on the
feminist literature, see Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987).
18. C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982); accord Gibbs, Arnold & Burkhart, Sex Differences
in the Expression of Moral Judgment, 55 Child Development 1040 (1984).
19. See Walker, Moral Stages and Moral Orientations in Real-Life and Hypothetical Dilemmas,
58 Child Development 842 (1987); Walker, Sex Differences in the Development ofMoral Reasoning:
A Critical Review, 55 Child Development 677 (1984) (asserting that substantial evidence of lack of
sex differences in moral development is disregarded); Greeno & Maccoby, How Different Is the "Dif-
ferent Voice"?, 11 Signs 310 (1986) (questioning Gilligan's methodology and citing contrary evi-
dence); Luria, A Methodological Critique, 11 Signs 316 (1986) (rejecting Gilligan's methodology).
For Gilligan's response to her critics, see, e.g., Reply by Carol Gilligan, 11 Signs 324 (1986).
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might put the notion that there is some fundamental distinction between
the way men analyze problems and the way women do.20
A vision similar to Gilligan's was long ago seized upon by scholars as-
serting the "point of view" of the putatively oppressed black community.
Although much of the analysis of the significance of difference requires
considerable erudition to be understood, the underlying proposition does
not, and indeed, it possesses a rough and ready common sense that proba-
bly reflects the day-to-day experience of vast numbers of people in our "us
and them" society.
The difference approach proposes, for example, that writers who are
white and writers who are not are at opposite ends of an unbridgeable
chasm, that their experiences of reality diverge so sharply that beyond a
certain, limited point, a shared understanding is virtually impossible.
Black writers (and other non-white writers) are said to have different
voices from white ones, to think and speak and of course write in the way
that their background has prepared them. They see some things-those
related to their oppression, those related to their culture-more sharply
than others possibly can.21 A just society, it is said, would take account of
that difference rather than seek to silence it.
This vision of difference presupposes the existence of what is often
. called the "black experience," a uniquely black reality that has shaped in
similar ways the lives of all people who are black. This black experience
is said to be something that no one who is white can possibly fathom. A
20. See, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 38-39 (1987) (arguing that Gilligan's work
affirms difference "when difference means dominance" and therefore affirms "the qualities and char-
acteristics of powerlessness"); Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 Signs 304 (1986)
(assessing dangers in suggesting biological source of differences). Some feminists who have embraced
her conclusions have been critical of her methodology or style. See, e.g., Auerbach, Blum, Smith, &
Williams, Commentary: On Gilligan's A Different Voice, 11 Feminist Studies 149, 160 (1985) ("The
problem with her book is not that its politics are bad, but that it lacks a politics altogether"). Others
have accepted the work, and considered principally its implications. See, e.g., Benjamin, Book Review,
9 Signs 297, 298 (1983) ("Gilligan's work. . . points to the radical potential of women's search for
universal norms through a psychological rather than a formal logical mode of thought"); Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 591 (1986)
(Gilligan's work implies "a feminine vision" of "a mature virtue-based ideology" that "has been
conspicuously absent from the shaping of [American] moral or political traditions"). Cf Van Gelder,
Carol Gilligan: Leader for a Different Kind of Future, Ms., Jan. 1984, at 37 (uncritical acceptance
of the work).
21. Cf H.L. Gates, The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism
(1988). This position should not be confused with the critical stance attacking the use of the concept of
racial difference as a tool for oppression. See, for example, the essays collected in "Race," Writing,
and Difference (H.L. Gates ed. 1986).
The notion that black theorists reason in ways that are different from the ways of white theorists
has sparked a small controversy within the literature on race and law. As a result of their special
experience, it is said, scholars of color will support such programs as racial preferences by articulating
reasons unlikely to occur to white civil rights advocates. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflec-
tions on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984); cf Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987). This
contention, however, has been sharply challenged on both empirical and logical grounds. See Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989).
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classic statement of this proposition came from Stokely Carmichael and
Charles Hamilton in their book Black Power:
Our point is that no matter how "liberal" a white person might be,
he cannot ultimately escape the overpowering influence-on himself
and on black people-of his whiteness in a racist society.
Liberal whites often say that they are tired of being told "you
can't understand what it is to be black." They claim to recognize and
acknowledge this. Yet the same liberals will often turn around and
tell black people that they should ally themselves with those who
can't understand, who share a sense of superiority based on
whiteness.22
Plainly, this idea has the advantage of silencing critics, because the three
magic words, "You can't understand," free the speaker from the need to
seek a dialogue with those who disagree; the fact of oppression becomes its
own authority.
Like the claim of gender difference, the claim of racial difference has its
critics. Critics of difference challenge, for example, the premise that a
monolithic "black experience" exists and has shaped all black people in
ways that make them more like each other than any black people are like
people who are white. 23 The idea of difference, moreover, carries a very
real risk of stigmatizing and perhaps even ghettoizing black intellectuals.
If they-white intellectuals-can't do what we-black intellectuals-do,
then perhaps we can't do what they do either. Harold Cruse must have
been painfully aware of this possibility two decades ago when he wrote in
The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual:
Even at this advanced stage in Negro history, the Negro intellec-
tual is a retarded child whose thinking processes are still geared to
piddling intellectual civil writism [sic] and racial integrationism.
This is all he knows. In the meantime, he plays second and third
fiddle to white intellectuals in all the establishments-Left, Center,
and Right. The white intellectuals in these establishments do not
recognize the Negro intellectual as a man who can speak both for
himself and for the best interests of the nation, but only as someone
who must be spoken for and on behalf oP"
Small wonder-if our claim is that we speak, in effect, in a language that
others cannot hope to understand.
22. S. Carmichael & C. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation 61-62 (1967).
23. This, perhaps, is what Andrew Delbanco had in mind when he warned, in a generally
favorable review of the recent work of Henry Louis Gates, that the effort to define a uniquely black
literary tradition "flirts with the compensatory, but potentially insidious, idea of a residual race-
consciousness that somehow survives in the blood." See Delbanco, Tallcing Texts, New Republic, Jan.
9/16, 1989, at 28, 34.
24. H. Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual 475 (1967).
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Besides, there is something vaguely derisive in the conclusion that those
of us who are black intellectuals are stuck with doing things in one way,
forever marked by race. Edward Shils, writing at about the same time as
Cruse, surely recognized this when he observed:
[M]embers of the various communities in the major areas of intellec-
tual life evaluate intellectual performance with little or no reference
to nationality, religion, race, political party, or class. An African
novelist wants to be judged as a novelist, not an African; a Japanese
mathematician would regard it as an affront if an analysis of his
accomplishment referred to his pigmentation; a British physicist
would find it ridiculous if a judgment on his research referred to his
being "white."211
This was obviously a hope, not a statement of fact, and as hopes go, it was
a good one. But Shils's closing prediction-that "primordial attachment to
color . . . will survive but not so strongly as to deflect the intellect and
imagination from their appropriate activities"26-is precisely what theo-
rists of difference deny. And in that denial they implicitly, if unwittingly,
condemn scholars of color to a narrow and unhappy path, writing mostly
for one another, and never able to aspire to a higher goal than, for exam-
ple, best black economist.2'7
Theorists of difference have a further and more fundamental difficulty.
Without a good deal of side-stepping and rhetorical excess, they are una-
ble to account for the work of such prominent black critics of racial pref-
erences and other aspects of the civil rights orthodoxy as Thomas Sowell
and Glenn Loury. Has the black experience touched them? Does it touch
their work? Ah, well, perhaps they have surrendered to the racist society
or sold out or something of that sort. In any event, the problem must be
with them, the dissenters, and not with the theory that the black experi-
ence has shaped us all in the same way. The notion that reasonable
minds, even reasonable black minds, might differ over some part of the
orthodoxy is treated by theorists of difference as worse than absurd-why, .
it isn't even worth mentioning!28
Theorists of difference will very likely have similar trouble accounting
for the work of Julius Lester, who is nobody's conservative, neo- or other-
wise, but nevertheless is evidently a critic of difference. His narrative is a
statement of the universality of human experience-including the suffer-
ing and oppression that are said by scholars of difference to be so crucial
25. Shils, Color and the Afro-Asian Intellectual, Daedalus, Spring 1967, at 279, 288.
26. Id. at 293.
27. In a story that might be apocryphal, but is too good to pass up, it is said that Thomas Sowell
hung up on a member of Ronald Reagan's staff who telephoned him shortly after the 1980 election to
inform him that the new President wanted Sowell to be his first black cabinet member.
28. For an extended criticism of the refusal by theorists of difference to acknowledge the black
dissenters, see Kennedy, supra note 21.
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to creating the different voices in which different communities speak. But
for Julius Lester, different communities speak to each other, and there are
messages for those prepared to listen. Thus although he wonders as he
prepares a seder whether "a Gentile can understand Judaism and Jewish-
ness," his conclusion is a rejection of the idea that the uniqueness of black
experience makes white understanding impossible:
The thought is as repugnant to me as when blacks tell whites they
cannot know what it is to be black. It is a statement that negates
literature, art and music, nullifies the realm of the imaginative and
says it is impossible for human beings to reach out from one loneli-
ness to another and assuage both. If that were true, I would not see
aspects of myself in haiku and the poems of Sappho, the music of
Bach and the watercolors of Winslow Homer.29
The point of this passage, and a good one, is surely not that the scholars
of difference are wholly wrong, but that the experiences that make us
different do not make us unable to understand or appreciate one another.
Difference is a bridgeable chasm. It is bridged when we "reach out from
one loneliness to another," not in anger, not in frustration, not in hatred,
but in love; not lifting the world up by its ears, but touching the world on
its human heart.so
Still, in order to be useful, the bridge must finally be built not simply in
the mind of the observer, but in the world; the decision might begin with
emotion, but it must end with will. This, surely, is what David Tracy had
in mind when he noted that "[e]mpathy is much too romantic a category
to comprehend this necessary movement . . . from otherness, to possibil-
ity, to similarity-in-difference."sl Bridging the chasm is a choice, and not
always an easy one. But it is not enough simply to look at the one who is
different, the lonely, suffering other, and say, "Gee, that's too bad" or
"Gee, I understand." For Lester, as for Tracy, the triumph over differ-
ence is finally a social act as well as a spiritual one.
Once armed with the notion of difference as a chasm to be bridged, one
can readily imagine an impressive panoply of lines that might be blurred
or crossed by a world willing to proclaim, "We love you because you are
different; we love your differentness; we value it; we want to learn from
it." The continuing struggle to mend the division between black and white
in the United States is only one such border-crossing. The battle against
the oppression of gay men and lesbian women and efforts to empower the
29. P. 172.
30. In this vision, Lester sounds a theme common to some of the work of the black radicals who
reached political maturity in the 1960s (a group with which, accurately or not, he was once identi-
fied). Cf H. Newton, Revolutionary Suicide 372 (1973): "We will touch God's heart; we will touch
the people's heart, and together we will move the mountain." This is not of course to imply that
Julius Lester and Huey Newton are ideological soulmates.
31. D. Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope 20-21 (1987).
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homeless are plainly others. Difference, for Lester, has a human face, and
people should talk to each other.s2
On this point, too, Julius Lester seems to understand better than many
of us where responsibility lies. This is evident not only from Lovesong,
but from what he has written since, a work product that includes this
moving passage:
Suffering belongs to us all. The advantage blacks and Jews can
have, if they choose it, is the knowledge of their suffering.
The knowing is only a beginning, however. What to do with our
suffering is the task. Only when we assume this responsibility do we
learn how to be. Only to the degree that we carry our suffering
(without anger or blame or remorse or self-pity), only to the extent
that we learn to live with a pain that cannot be relieved do we re-
deem suffering and make ourselves whole.
But there's the rub! All too many blacks expect, demand, that
white people relieve their suffering. After all, have not whites been
the agents of it?
That is the historical paradox that must be accepted and not quar-
reled with. Yes, white people caused the suffering. But they cannot
relieve it because it is not suffering that can be relieved. It can only






But that is the ineluctable reality. Do I live in perpetual anger at
my suffering and the perpetrators of it, or do I -receive it with love?
As a black, as a Jew, my responsibility as a teacher is to use my
suffering to reach out to touch the suffering of my students. The
history, literature, and religions of the peoples of which I am part
and about whom I teach require nothing less.ss
32. Lester's approach to difference is consistent across other controversial issues, as Lester himself
illustrates in his defense of Israel's policies on the use of military force against Palestinian Arabs. For
while he says on the one hand "I have not been to Israel and will probably not go for many years
because I do not want to see Jews treating Arabs as blacks were treated in the South," p. 177, and
adds that he is saddened because, in his view, Israel will not, as he thinks it should, "be better than
other nations" and "set a new standard for politics and international relations," id., he appends a
caveat that captures the essence of what contemporary scholars have in mind when they write about
difference:
I do not know. I am not Israeli. I have not lived through five wars in twenty-four years. I
do not board a bus wondering if a bomb has been planted beneath one of the seats. My
dailiness does not include walking the streets seeing soldiers with rifles on their shoulders. My
dailiness does not include memories of sons, fathers and brothers killed in one of those wars.
[d. He does not pretend that this is a complete defense of Israeli policy, but that is not what it is
meant to be. It is, rather, a restatement of his main theme, the human face of difference: nearly
always, there are two sides.
33. Lester, Teaching and Being: Autobiographical Reflections, Religion & Intellectual Life,
Summer 1988, at 21, 23.
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The words are beautiful; but they are subversive, too. By touching the
suffering of others, by encouraging them to bear oppression with love, and
by insisting, in the end, that each of us is responsible for himself or her-
self, Julius Lester challenges more orthodoxy than he might permit him-
self to recognize.
This matter of responsibility is another point on which left has recently
met right, as the neo-conservative movement, especially among black intel-
lectuals, has increasingly come to criticize programmatic and bureaucratic
responses to poverty and other legacies of slavery as inefficient and
counterproductive.84 Black separatists took the same position long ago, al-
beit for different reasons.81i Now, quite suddenly, it seems that the old
sixties rallying cry-"The freedom of black people is the responsibility of
black people"-is not a separatist declaration of independence, but a more
traditionalist declaration of self-reliance. Do not rely on others to relieve
your suffering, it says; the responsibility is yours. Thus, Lester once more:
I wanted to give [my daughter] a lecture on The Federalist papers
because she is growing up at a time when the concept of rights has
been perverted until it is synonymous with desires. Even a cursory
reading of the Bill of Rights makes it clear that rights are guaran-
teed to the individual as protection from the power of government
and that is all. People talk as if rights were handed down by God at
Sinai and sanction anything their hearts desire.88
For Lester, curiously, this passage questions whether the Constitution
protects the "rights" to abortion or unpopular sexual preference; but
whatever one might think of the constitutional merits of those rights, they
are plainly claims against "the power of government." His critique has
more direct application, one would think, to racial preferences, which are
not rights against government as such, but rights to particular social
outcomes.
In the era of Brown v. Board of Education,87 and the long and desper-
ate struggle that preceded it, the government was the oppressor, and its
racist laws were on the books for all to see. It is far too thin a reading of
that decision and the struggle against segregation to say, as some critics of
racial preferences do, that the principle for which people were fighting
34. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? (1984); Wi'lIiam Julius Wilson,
The Declining Significance of Race (1978); Loury, "Matters of Color": Blacks and the Constitu-
tional Order, The Public Interest, Winter 1987, at 109.
35. See, e.g., R. Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America (1969); S. Carmichael & C.
Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (1967). One would have to count
Julius Lester, in his earlier incarnation, as a member of the same group. See Lester, The Necessity
For Separation, Ebony, August 1970, at 167.
36. P. 116.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and dying was that the government ought to be color blind.ss Surely the
evil was a pervasive system of racial subjugation, designed and operated to
keep black people in thrall. But pointing out the distinction is not a refu-
tation of the charge that racial preferences carry costs. Even if color con-
sciousness was not the principal evil then, it does not follow that color
consciousness is a good thing now. In particular, the transformation of the
struggle from one against government subjugation to one against societal
oppression has left the enemy more amorphous and the principle behind
the struggle a little harder to specify.
The enemy that racial preferences are designed to attack is history it-
self. The inheritors of those who were the oppressors are charged with the
responsibility of cleaning up the mess their ancestors made.se Perhaps
they should; but if racial preferences are to be a part of our reality, we
ought not to pretend that they are a happy one. One need not be an oppo-
nent of preferences to understand that they have real costs, not only to the
amorphous mass of individuals excluded from their benefits, but, more
important to the immediate point, to those the programs are designed to
assist. True, it conceivably goes too far to say, as some critics do, that
racial preferences are a major cause of white derogation of the ability of
students or professionals of color.40 On the other hand, there may be ef-
fects on the psyches of successful black professionals, because of the driv-
ing need to know that we have made it on our merits. It is the peculiar
tragedy of racial preferences that in the name of improving the position of
the group, they make it difficult for individual members of the group to be
sure of what they have done. If jobs and education are somehow "due" us,
because of our color and our history, then when we get them, what do we
have? Can we tell whether anything is earned?41 Can we tell how good
we are-or if we are any good at all?41 Where is the work, the gain, the
self-respect that comes from knowledge of individual accomplishment?
38. To suggest that racial segregation and racially conscious remedial programs present the same
issue "is to pretend that history never happened." Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale
L.J. 420, 434 (1988). Su also Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 (1986).
39. Proponents of racial preferences use the term "ancestors" figuratively, not literally. A part of
the burden of ameliorating the lingering effects of the past is also to be shouldered by those whose
ancestors could not have participated in the oppression because they were on the other side of an
ocean. Charles Black has eloquently defended this burden as an obligation of citizenship, little differ-
ent from paying taxes. See Black, Civil Rights in Times of Economic Stress: Jurisprudential and
Philosophic Aspects, 1976 U. Ill. L.F. 559, 562. .
40. For a rejection of the criticism, see Kennedy, supra note 38, at 1331. My own view is that
there might be more to the criticism than meets the eye, a point I assess in a forthcoming essay. See
Carter, On Being an Affirmative Action Baby (work-in-progress).
41. For examples of this argument, see T. Sowell, Black Education: Myths and Tragedies 292
(1972); Loury, supra note 34. I do not mean the statement in the text to represent some final word in
these matters, and it is certainly not my intention to deny that I myself have been a beneficiary of
racial preferences; on the contrary, I would not have had my education, and conceivably my job,
without them. In a forthcoming essay, I will set out in more detail my views on the relationship
between preferential treatment and professional achievement. Su Carter, supra note 40.
42. See Loury, Beyond Civil Rights, New Republic, Oct. 7, 1985, at 22, 25 (racial preferences
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Julius Lester is a supporter of racial preferences.48 Whether it was his
intention or not, however, when Lester celebrates the individual who
dreams and works and transforms himself or herself, he is participating in
the continuing societal conversation about preferences, most poignantly
when he expresses his jealousy of his son's unencumbered childhood:
If you were a black child in the 1940s, childhood was a luxury
that could get you killed. Education in those all-black schools was a
process of being trained-intellectually and emotionally-to survive
and persevere. We were not allowed to think that the white world
could defeat us. It would discriminate against us, deny us jobs, force
us to live where it wanted us to, lynch us, but defeat us? Never. If
we didn't succeed in becoming doctors, lawyers, teachers, ministers
or writers to serve our people, we were to keep the dream alive and
pass it on to the next generation-the dream and the toughness to
endure when dreams do not come true.44
And he adds:
I am merely one in the generations of black intellectuals and pro-
fessionals who were required to sacrifice their childhoods, personal
dreams and desires because our task was to prepare the way. No
other alternative existed.411
The point, surely, is that it is possible now to dream other dreams than
what one's posterity might accomplish; and one of the dreams that it is
possible to dream is of accomplishment, not by luck, not by gift, not even
by right, but by dint of earning a place-by being better than others.
But these are not words that black people are supposed to speak-that
is, not if they do not want to be dismissed angrily as "conservative" or
"reactionary" or some grimmer epithet. Racially conscious affirmative ac-
tion programs are the shibboleth of the contemporary civil rights agenda.
One may quibble on the burden of proof needed to make out a case of
racial discrimination, one may debate the best way of relieving the pathol-
ogy of the underclass, one may even attack that former shibboleth, school
busing, and not be silenced with a label. But opposition to affirmative
action is evidently different. To be against racial preferences is to be
against the progress of the race. To be white and against it (as most white
people are) is to be racist; to be black and against it (as many black people
are and most black people may well be) is to be a tool of the oppressor.4e
make it impossible for black people "confidently to assert, if only to themselves, that they are as good
as their achievements would seem to suggest").
43. See Lester, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988.
44. P. 111.
45. P. 112.
46. A February 1988 Gallup survey commissioned by Newsweek asked the following question:
"Because of past discrimination should qualified blacks receive preference over equally qualified
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Yet there is nothing wrong, and much right, with advocacy of a color-
blind society,47 and it is a peculiarity of modern civil rights rhetoric that
those who proclaim this as their goal are so often, on that evidence alone,
placed in the enemy camp. That there are racists who oppose preferential
set-asides and affirmative action programs is doubtless true. But it does
not follow that every opponent is one of them.
There is something peculiar, moreover, about advocating a continuation
of racial consciousness for the sake of eradicating it. The one thing that
every version of racial preferences has in common, by definition, is an
explicit consciousness of race; in effect, the programs insist that an em-
ployer or college or professional school take note of the race of an individ-
ual applicant. That might be a way to ensure minority representation or
diversity or role models or better opportunities, but it has little to do with
getting people to stop thinking of others in racial terms.
On the contrary, systems of racial preferences force upon us a peculiar
and risky grammar. People become fungible representatives of groups, and
the groups do not mix. If ten percent of the spaces in the entering class at
the medical school of the University of California at Davis are set aside
for members of particular races (the euphemism "disadvantaged" is a non
sequitur), then Allan Bakke, because he is white, cannot have one.48 He is
not a disadvantaged individual, he is a white person, and nothing that he
can do can transform him into a person eligible for entry through the
special program. Those admitted to the program are not individuals, ei-
ther; they are representatives of racial minorities, and no matter what they
achieve, they will likely be thought of that way throughout their profes-
sional lives.
There is a surface innocence to all of this, and certainly systems of
racial preferences are not intended to denigrate either those permitted to
benefit from them or those who are excluded. But we blink at reality if we
deny that the peculiar grammar forced upon us by programs that treat
people as members of groups, and assign characteristics on the basis of
that membership, has an ugly mirror image, for it is as easy to assign
negative characteristics as positive ones.49 Moreover, although Allan
Bakke is plainly not a victim of a system of racial subjugation, such as the
one that long oppressed people of color, he is just as plainly a victim of
whites in such matters as getting into college or getting jobs or not?" Among white respondents, 80
percent said no, 14 percent said yes. Among black respondents, 50 percent said no, 40 percent said
yes. Newsweek, March 7, 1988, at 23.
47. It must be said, however, that if majority rule really aggregates private preferences, then it is
somewhat paradoxical to expect color-blind governance in a society in which individuals often make
private decisions that incorporate considerations of color. See Carter, supra note 38, at 434-38.
48. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. Cf Carter, supra note 38, at 434 ("Once it is accepted that race can carry significance-a
point which is central to the case for racial consciousness in remedial programs-the dispute may be
reduced to one over what race more rationally signifies: an educational disadvantage that a just society
will find ways to overcome, or a tendency toward criminality that a just society will avoid.")
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racial discrimination, an entirely distinct wrong, but not a trivial one. The
backlash against racial preferences is not trivial either, and explaining it
away as racism is just another way of silencing critics without debating
them-and another sign that we are losing the moral high ground, for
there was a time when the movement had no reluctance to debate. We
must learn once more to love and cherish individuals for who they are, not
what they represent; and, having learned it once more ourselves, we can
once more teach it to the world.
It is not really my purpose, however, to weigh the relative merits of
color-blindness and racial preferences. My larger point, rather, is to note
the way in which Lester's celebration of the individual and of the com-
monality of suffering is inconsistent with important aspects of racially
conscious programs. Still, I hasten to add that Julius Lester does not ex-
plicitly offer this challenge; the gloss on his views is entirely mine. Lester
makes no criticism in Lovesong of the goals of the inheritors of the civil
rights mantle; his message, in fact, has nothing to do with policy prescrip-
tion. The task that he sets for the black community is one of cleansing our
souls. He makes no pretense that if we can do that, everything else will
fall into place, but I do understand him to insist that we are heading in
the wrong direction. .
III. OUR ENEMIES, OURSELVES
One of the wrong directions in which Julius Lester believes that we are
heading is exemplified by his own experiences as he was drawn ever
closer to Judaism. For a good part of the troubles in which Lester has
found himself have arisen not from his emphasis on commonality of suf-
fering, but because of his insistence that black people are particularly re-
luctant to admit the commonality between their suffering and the suffer-
ing of Jews. Or perhaps reluctance is too weak a word for the
phenomenon he is trying to describe; for while Lester is not prepared to
come out and say so, his view is plainly that anti-Semitism is widespread
in the black community, and that those to whom he refers as "black lead-
ership" are doing little about it.
Now, it must be said that Julius Lester knows more than a little bit
about anti-Semitism, having been on both ends of it. During the late six-
ties he struggled through his own period of what he calls "political anti-
Semitism,"IIO a stance that included the airing of virulently hateful re-
marks about Jews (not, it should be noted, his own remarks) on his radio
show.III He did this, he explains now, in order to "facilitate contact be-
so. P.59.
51. Most controversial was a poem written by a high-school student and including the line: "Hey,
Jew boy, with that yarmulke on your head/You pale-faced Jew boy-I wish you were dead." P. 51.
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tween Jews and blacks."113 Well, maybe. Just possibly the objective could
have been achieved without filling the airwaves with hate. But that is very
old news, and whatever one thinks of Lester's present explanation for
what he did two decades ago, it is far more urgent to come to grips with
what he claims now-that there is anti-Semitism throughout black
America, and that black Americans refuse to talk about it.
The idea that anti-Semitism is rampant within the black community is
an old theme of Lester's. In fact, it got him into trouble a decade ago,
when Andrew Young was forced to resign as the Carter Administration's
ambassador to the United Nations after violating American policy by
meeting with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Across the country, black people attacked the Administration for turning
its back on Young, and some of the critics claimed that Jimmy Carter had
abandoned his friend and supporter because of pressure from Jews. Julius
Lester was incensed, and he penned a well-known essay entitled "The
Uses of Suffering." In that essay, he attacked the positions of some black
leaders who had demanded that Jews "consult" with them "before taking
positions contrary to the best interests of the Black community."68 Lester
responded: "Black leadership still seems to be ignorant of the fact that
Jews have been hurt by Black indifference to the fate of Israel."" And
then he added the lines that probably made most of the subjects of his
criticism enemies for life:
Because Blacks have been silent while Jews continued to be mur-
dered, I am appalled that they dare come forward now to self-
righteously lecture Jews to "show more sensitivity" when Black
leadership is guilty of ethnocentric insensitivity. Arrogance is, how-
ever, a common fault of oppressed people when they believe their
own status as victims gives them the advantage of moral superiority.
But morality is not found in lecturing others on morality. Morality
is painfully earned by constant awareness of one's own limitations,
mistakes, and fragile humanity. Morality comes by constantly adjur-
ing yourself and not others to "show more sensitivity."66
Perhaps he could have stopped there and avoided the worst; perhaps he
should have. (As Lester and his wife awaited the essay's publication in
The Village Voice, she asked him how he felt. "Scared," he replied. "I
wish someone else had written this."") But Lester was driven by some-
thing close to anguish to write what had to be written. Even now, a dec-
ade later, the words leap from the page; they are the words of a man too
52. P. 56. For Lester's fuller account of this incident, see pp. 50-65.
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angry to stop. Jewish opposition to affirmative action, he insisted, was no
excuse:
I cannot understand why Black leadership lacks the simple humanity
to express gratitude for past support, as well as the anger we now
feel in the face of Jewish conservatism. Instead, Black leadership has
acted as if Jews were responsible for Andy Young's resignation. I
thought Andy was responsible for that, and, with great dignity, he
explained that he needed to speak as he wished. But, as Western
history amply demonstrates, whenever something goes wrong, it is
easy to blame the J ews.1I7
Thus, he asserted, the black leadership is "morally barren," and is in
effect saying of the world's indifference to the fate of Jews, "we don't give
a damn." He concluded with the five angriest words in the entire essay:
"Blacks, too, can be Germans."118
As one might imagine, when the essay was finally published, there was
bedlam. Overnight, he says, he became "a nonperson" in the black com-
munity.1I9 He summarizes the reaction to his essay in a single, neat
phrase: "I feel like a Mennonite who has questioned the existence of the
Holy Trinity."60 The sentence is more poignant than it first appears, not
only because of its strange, sad subtext ("I am only proclaiming truth as I
understand it, and no one should get angry at me for that"), but because it
anticipates an episode that Lester describes later in the book, when he
receives an agonized telephone call from his father, the minister, who has
learned that his son has rejected Jesus as his saviour:
Daddy does not understand and, I realize now, has never under-
stood. He has tried to accept but he cannot. How could he have
spent most of his eighty-three years traveling and preaching, bring-
ing the word of Jesus to thousands and thousands and having them
accept Jesus into their hearts as Lord and Saviour, and yet neither of
his sons goes to church, neither of his sons believes in that Jesus who
is the center of his life.
I hear that eternal child in me wanting to plead, "But, Daddy.
Just because I don't believe in Jesus doesn't mean I'm not religious."
But I do not allow the child to speak, because Daddy cannot under-
stand. To be religious is to be Christian, and Protestant Christian at
that.61
His father's mortification at Lester's rejection of the Christian faith mir-
rors the rejection he feels from colleagues and friends as he moves closer
57. Quoted at p. 129.
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and closer to Judaism. He is not prepared to label his father an anti-
Semite, and from the loving portrait in the book, there is no reason to
assume that the elder Lester was one. Colleagues and friends, however,
are a different matter. Their responses to what for Lester is a profound
spiritual journey are, in his view, essentially anti-Semitic.62 Since the pub-
lication of Lovesong, Lester has repeated his theme that anti-Semitism is a
problem of the black community with which the leadership refuses to
dea1.63
Lester's critique appears at an uneasy moment in the relationship be-
tween the black and Jewish communities. The traditional alliance, which
struggled so hard for so many basic freedoms, has lately been under con-
siderable strain. Theories abound on the reasons.1U Without getting into
that point, at least not in detail, it certainly bears mention that Lester's
criticism notwithstanding, any number of black leaders have mourned the
rift and are tending, with Jewish allies, to its repair. What success they
will have remains to be seen. But it must also be said that trying to offer
reasons for the split, and even trying to mend it, simply finesses Lester's
central, implicit claim, that anti-Semitism pervades the black community
in general, and its leadership in particular.
Here as elsewhere, Lester is faced with an immediate and unacknowl-
edged difficulty: it is not as easy as it might have been twenty-five years
ago-before Memphis, say-to point to a single group and say, "This is
the black leadership." If the black community ever was monolithic, if its
leaders ever presented a united front, that era has passed. The black com-
munity is divided, often heatedly so, over ends, means, politics, and per-
sonalities. Lester might just as well say "black people whose positions I
reject" as refer to the "black leadership" as a readily identifiable entity.
Even if one concedes, moreover, that there is still a "black leader-
ship"-comprising, perhaps, the principals of the most influential civil
rights organizations and a handful of well-known politicians, journalists,
activists, and intellectuals-it is still not so clear that Lester ought to sin-
gle them out for special criticism, while leaving the masses alone. The
black leadership, if there is a black leadership, did not arrive suddenly
from another planet. The leaders are not leaders (pace Ronald Reagan)
because of some self-interested pursuit of power; they are the leaders be-
cause they see and are able to articulate the often dimly realized feelings
of anger and discontent that abound in the black community. If, as Lester
62. See, e.g., Black Professor Accuses His Colleagues of Censorship and Anti-Semitism, Chroni-
cle of Higher Education, June 8, 1988, at A13.
63. See Lester, When Black Unity Works Against Critical Inquiry, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1988.
64. For discussions of the strains in the alliance, see J. Kaufman, Broken Alliance: The Turbu-
lent Times Between Blacks and Jews in America (1988); J. M. Cuddihy,Jews, Blacks, and the Cold
War at the Top, in The Ordeal of Civility (1974).
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seems to think, black leaders tend toward anti-Semitism, it is fantasy to
imagine that their constituents do not.
Still, the premise-that anti-Semitism is prevalent in the black commu-
nity-is irksome. It is tempting to dismiss his claim as lacking empirical
support, as merely anecdotal, as a product of his understandable anger at
his own treatment at the hands of the Afro-American Studies Department
at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Lester describes a scene in
which one of his colleagues, on reading "The Uses of Suffering," becomes
apoplectic, and screams:
You think I haven't studied the Holocaust? Well, I have, goddamit! I
don't see a damned thing about it that's unique. I think black folks
have been through more hell than a Jew in Auschwitz could
imagine. 811
Lester, by his own account, becomes so angry in return that he tells his
colleague never to speak to him again.
There are many layers to the tragedy in that small story. The worst,
probably, is the way that his colleague insists on making suffering a com-
petition-that it matters who has suffered most. The argument is quite
commonly made, and by no means by black people alone, that the Holo-
caust is not unique, that it is no worse in its way than, for example, the
slaughter of the Hutu by the Tutsi or the Armenian genocide. But that is
the same trap. The horror of the Holocaust does not come in its unique-
ness; the horror does not even need an explanation.
The same can be said of the centuries of oppression of black folk in the
Western world. This does not mean that the oppressions are the same, but
it also does not mean that they are different. Humanity has proved itself
capable of perpetrating any number of horrors, and to those who suffer
under them, each is unique. The tragic error comes in assuming that it
makes a difference which one is the most horrible.
Is it anti-Semitic to criticize Jews for refusing to let the world forget
the Holocaust? I would rather put the question another way: Why criti-
cize Jews for refusing to let the world forget the Holocaust? God knows,
we who are black ought never to let the world forget the African slave
trade. I would think that our responsibility is what Lester says it is: to
share in the suffering of others. Thus, we who are black should also re-
fuse to let the world forget the Holocaust; and we should insist that Jews
join us in refusing to let the world forget the slave trade. Nothing ought to
turn on who has suffered more. Alliances of people traditionally despised
are natural and important, and with good reason: had black people been
present in Europe in significant numbers, Hitler would have had another
65. Quoted at p. 134.
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project besides making the continent judenrein, for he despised us as
well.88
But of course, Lester's belief in black anti-Semitism is fueled by more
than the fact that one of his colleagues said that he was tired of hearing
about the Holocaust. The reactions to Lester himself, and to his Jewish-
ness, were-at least in his perception-too passionate to be readily ex-
plained in any other way. 'Yet, to call black anti-Semitism pervasive is
surely to exaggerate it. In particular, if Lester's claim is that most black
people or most black leaders are anti-Semitic, then it is overstated.87 At
the same time, my own impression, admittedly as anecdotal as Lester's, is
that those of us who are black are kidding ourselves if we pretend that we
as a people are somehow invulnerable to the taint of bigotry. There is
anti-Semitism in our community. Sometimes it comes out as insensitivity,
sometimes it explodes into hostility, and its roots are mysterious and com-
plex-but it is there. The fact that it is not a majority sentiment is no
reason for complacency; on the contrary, it is cause to be scrupulous in
rooting it out.
Plainly, when one thinks of black anti-Semitism, one thinks at once of
Louis Farrakhan, who calls himself a man of God while weaving into his
gospel of self-reliance and self-esteem a stark and unmistakable thread of
hate. It is a deep tragedy that so many black people insisted that Far-
rakhan's remarks during the 1984 presidential campaign-including his
slur on Judaism as a "gutter religion," his statement that Hitler "was a
very great man," and his comparison of himself to Hitler-were misun-
derstood, taken out of context, or blown out of proportion. The first two
defenses stand up only weakly against the evidence," while the last shows
66. Early in 1942, Hitler told associates: "My feelings against Americanism are feelings of hatred
and deep repugnance. . .. Everything about the behavior of American society reveals that it's half
Judaized and the other half Negrified." Q}wted in 2 W.L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany 895 n. (paper ed. 1966).
67. For example, when Steve Cokely, an aide to the mayor of Chicago, suggested that Jewish
doctors were responsible for the spread of AIDS in the black community, a handful of black politi-
cians issued bizarre statements in his defense, but after Cokely was fired, a survey indicated that only
8 percent of black Chicagoans believed that he should have been retained. N.Y. Times, July 29,1988.
68. In a radio sermon broadcast on March 11, 1984, Farrakhan said this about comparisons
between himself and Hitler:
Here, the Jews don't like Farrakhan, so they call him Hitler. Well, that's a good name.
Hitler was a very great man. He wasn't great for me as a black person, but he was a great
German, and he rose Germany up from the ashes of her defeat by the united force of all
Europe and America after the First World War.
He added what was apparently intended as a conciliatory note:
Now, I'm not proud of Hitler's evils against the Jewish people. But that's a matter of
record. He rose Germany up from nothing. Well. In a sense, you could say there's a similarity
in that we're rising our people up from nothing. But don't compare me with your wicked
killers.
Transcript reprinted in N.Y. Times, April 13, 1984, at B6. And in a television interview a month
later, he clarified the Hitler remark:
We know that the definition of "great" means something that is huge in magnitude, important,
consequential, exceedingly skillful. Hitler was all of that, but he was wicked. Babylon was
great, but wicked. Sodom and Gomorrah, Rome was great, but wicked. Hitler was great, but
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a tragic lack of sensitivity to the suffering of others. We are kidding our-
selves, moreover, if we pretend, for example, that it is possible to follow a
Farrakhan and remain untouched by the hatred in his message. Someone
who likes the Minister's message of self-help and says of the rest, "I know
he also says some nutty stuff about the Jews, but ..." is already making
a judgment about priorities, and condemning anti-Semitism is obviously
not one.
It is tempting to dismiss Farrakhan as a marginal character, but that is
a little too easy. While he has been condemned by major black organiza-
tions,69 he does not exist in a vacuum; he has audiences, and large ones,
who wax enthusiastic at every denunciation of Jews.70 His defenders in-
clude the editors of Essence, a fashion magazine with a huge circulation in
the black community.71 Moreover, Jesse Jackson's entanglement with
Farrakhan in 1984 (and Jackson's "Hymietown" remark that somehow
led Farrakhan to national prominence)72 did little to drive black voters
wicked. . .. [I]t is wicked in my judgment to take my words in saying that Hitler was great
but yet wicked, and then saying that I, a Jackson pal, hail Hitler. That's wicked.
CBS Morning News Interview, May 14, 1984, transcript reprinted in Amsterdam News, May 19,
1984, at 15. A few weeks later, in a broadcast on June 24, 1984, he said this about Israel and
Judaism:
Now that nation called Israel never has had any peace in 40 years and she will never have any
peace, because there can be no peace structured on injustice, thievery, lying and deceit and
using the name of God to shield your gutter religion under His holy and righteous name.
Transcript reprinted in N.Y. Times, June 29, 1984, at A12.
69. For example, Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, said that his organization "cannot and will not be a party to casting
aspersions on Judaism." N.Y. Times, June 29, 1984. John E. Jacob, head of the National Urban
League, called Farrakhan's remarks "inflammatory," but added-correctly-that "it is not proper to
hold black leadership responsible for every ill-conceived statement made by a prominent black." N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1984. Warith Deen Muhammad, leader of the American Muslim Mission, which
claims to be the true inheritor of the Black Muslim movement, said that Farrakhan "represents the
same kind of thing that Hitler taught." N.Y. Times, July 5, 1984. Bayard Rustin, chairman of the A.
Philip Randolph Institute, called Farrakhan "a marginal spokesperson for a dangerous, out-of-date
politics." N.Y. Times, June 17, 1984. Some civil rights leaders were more equivocal. Joseph Lowery,
head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was quoted as saying that he could not re-
spond to the "gutter religion" remark because he did not know what it meant. He added that "it
serves no good purpose at this point in history to denigrate a nationhood of Israel." N.Y. Times, June
28, 1984. Jackson himself explicitly disavowed Farrakhan's attacks on Israel and Judaism, calling his
statements "reprehensible and morally indefensible." N.Y. Times, June 29, 1984.
70. It is difficult not to be shaken on reading Julius Lester's account of sitting in Madison Square
Garden, listening to Farrakhan, and following the reaction of the crowd. See Lester, The Time Has
Come, New Republic, Oct. 28, 1985, at 11.
71. In July, 1984, both the editor and publisher of the magazine weighed in with articles urging
Jackson not to disavow Farrakhan. See Edwards, Winning With Jesse, Essence, July 1984; Lewis,
Impact ofJesse Jackson's Candidacy, Essence, July 1984. The magazine also provided Farrakhan
with space to call for the punishment of black leaders who did not support Jesse Jackson's presiden-
tial campaign. See Farrakhan, Crisis in Black Leadership, Essence, June 1984. He specifically men-
tioned Andrew Young, Julian Bond, Coleman Young, and Coretta Scott King.
72. Lester says that when he heard that Jackson had decided to run for President, "I was not
excited. I knew his Achilles' heel was his attitude toward Jews, and I waited for him to nick himself
with his poisonous arrow and he did." P. 208. When the "Hymietown" remark became public knowl-
edge, Lester found himself musing: "If Jackson had any integrity he would withdraw voluntarily,
thereby proving himself worthy of the presidency." Id. See also Lester, Man in the Mirror: The
Apotheosis of Jesse Jackson, New Republic, May 23, 1988. As will be seen, Lester's criticism of
Jackson was apparently one of the factors that turned his colleagues against him.
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from him in the presidential primaries in 1984 or 1988: black people who
voted voted overwhelmingly for Jackson.78 Nor were matters made better
by those Jackson supporters in 1984 who insisted in the wake of the
"Hymietown" and Farrakhan debacles that the Jewish community was
out to get him.74
In the particular case of Chicago, the racially tense city where Far-
rakhan has his headquarters, matters are especially bad. One need only
think of the outrage expressed by some of the city's most prominent black
politicians when the mayor fired an aide, Steve Cokely, for suggesting
(among other things) that Jewish physicians were injecting black patients
with the virus that transmits AIDS. (Farrakhan was ready for that one,
too: "The truth hurts," he explained.711)
The short of it is that there is plainly something to Lester's case, and
without regard to whether anti-Semitism pervades the black community,
there is enough of it that we ought to be doing something about it. My
own experience (again, admittedly anecdotal) is depressing, however, for I
have found that when faced with the claim that anti-Semitism motivates
some comment or behavior, the response of all too many black peo-
ple-including both those of the working class and well-educated profes-
sionals-is to explain matters; and when one is dealing with hatred, this
is already half a mistake. But it occurs nevertheless: "Oh, that wasn't
because of anti-Semitism, it was because they-" And there it is, the
problem: they did something wrong. What one Jew, or group of Jews,
may have done (or even allegedly done) is suddenly attributed to all: they
oppose affirmative action, or they exploit us in the inner city, or they
support South Africa, or they try to run our civil rights movement, or they
control the media. We don't hate them for their religion or culture, we
only hate what they do; we don't dislike them because they are Jewish,
we dislike them because of what they did. And furthermore, in the words
of a prominent black activist-furthermore, it's time to put a stop to "ob-
73. In 1984, Jackson received 77 percent of the black vote in the primaries. In 1988, he received
92 percent. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1988, at B7.
74. One Jackson defender, for example, contended that the charges of anti-Semitism lodged
against the candidate had nothing to do with the "Hymietown" remark but were simply a way of
avoiding meeting head-on the threat posed to "organized forces in the Jewish community" by "his
views on Israel and about race relations in the U.S." Beal, U.S. Politics Will Never Be the Same, The
Black Scholar, Sept./Oct. 1984, at 10. Calvin O. Butts, the executive minister of the Abyssinian
Baptist Church in New York, described as the "religious coordinator" of the Jackson campaign, called
for an end to "obsequious pandering to paranoid ethnic groups."· Amsterdam News, May 12, 1984, at
4. Audrey Edwards, the editor of Essence magazine, charged that "[w]hat the white press really found
most disturbing about those 'slurs' was that a Black man had the, nerve to suggest that he viewed a
certain group of people with the same disdain and distrust that a certain group of people has always
viewed us with." Winning with Jesse, Essence, July, 1984.
75. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1988. This is not to suggest, however, that either the political figures
who defended Cokely or Farrakhan himself were speaking for most black Chicagoans. See supra note
67.
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sequious pandering to paranoid ethnic groups."" In other words, we're
tired of letting them push us around!
Can these really be black people talking? It's almost too absurd for
comment-and yet it cannot be laughed off. It must be fought off, by our
sense of ourselves and our role in history. One cannot help but believe
that the shade of Martin Luther King, Jr., stirs with uneasy anger, for
King proclaimed it his duty to fight anti-Semitism wherever it might be
found and said, "It would be impossible to record the contribution that the
Jewish people have made toward the Negro's struggle for freedom-it has
been so great."77 The ghosts of Michael Schwerner and Andrew Good-
man and James Chaney, murdered side-by-side in a Mississippi swamp
for standing on the right side of history, must shudder with fury. Surely
the spirits of all those slain in the struggle for civil rights will rise up as
one to condemn this!
How can we, with our history, treat others who have been oppressed as
a they? We, so often isolated ourselves because, to too many we ourselves
have always been they, the other, as in "We can't have them working for
us because they are lazy and stupid" and "We can't have them living in
our neighborhood because they don't take care of their homes" and "We
can't have them in our schools because they steal and disrupt and have bad
values"-we of all people ought to know better. But all too many of us
think and speak and act as though ethnic stereotyping is the most natural
part of our existence. Perhaps it is; perhaps the rest of the world, in stere-
otyping us, has made us this way; but we ought not surrender to the
desire to do unto others as the rest of the world has done unto us.
The problem of black anti-Semitism, then, brings us full circle, back to
the central message of Lovesong: that those who have suffered should
reach out in love to other sufferers, rather than appropriating suffering as
something unique. Thus, if the civil rights movement is in tatters, perhaps
a part of the reason is that we ourselves have changed the tenor of our
thoughts and our words; perhaps we have lost the skill of meeting our
suffering with love. Lashing out at the world is a natural response to
oppression, but it is not the path to spiritual uplift, and besides, the world
might lash back. If Lester has matters right, then what remains of the
civil rights movement will not regain its moral and spiritual advantage
over its opponents until it rediscovers its moral and spiritual roots.
76. See supra note 74.
77. Quoted in Playboy Interview; Martin Luther King, Jr., reprinted in M.L. King, A Testa-
ment of Hope, 340, 370 U. Washington ed. 1986). In the same interview, King asked rhetorically:
How could there be anti-Semitism among Negroes when our Jewish friends have demon-
strated their commitment to the principle of tolerance and brotherhood not only in the form of
sizable contributions, but in many other tangible ways, and often at great personal sacrifice?
Id. at 370.
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Purges are never pretty. They are not meant to be. The more ruthless
and complete the campaign in which one's opponents are eliminated, the
more powerful the warning sent to those who might dissent in the future:
Beware, the message reads. See how we deal with those who deny the
official word. Don't get on the wrong side, or you could be next.
A purge is, in its essence, a denial of the right. to think. It punishes
those who disagree with the established view, or with a newly minted
view that is being made into the established one. And when a purge is
underway, the intellectuals, despised by everyone and with no protection
in sight, are usually among the first to go. One is reminded of what Karl
Marx is supposed to have said of the anarchist Bakunin: on the first day
of the revolution he is a treasure, on the second day he should be shot. Of
course everyone hates the intellectuals, for to be an intellectual is to be a
free thinker and a freer critic, to accept no proposition as beyond analysis
or dispute, and to serve as a roaming adversary of all that is perceived as
foolish, ill-conceived, or simplistic.
It is our habit to think of the purge as one of the many repulsive habits
of the Soviet state, or as a kind of minor political earthquake that inter-
mittently rumbles across the Third World. But we have purges of our
own, too, and while some of them are orderly-for example, the reconsti-
tution of the entire leadership of the federal bureaucracy each time that a
new President takes office-many others are decidedly unattractive. Few
Western-style purges are more saddening, and more threatening to free-
dom, than the disdainful treatment of intellectuals who dare to challenge
orthodoxy. And within this purge, the most frightening aspect to those of
us who are not white is the isolation of intellectual dissenters who happen
to be black.
The purging of Julius Lester is an unhappy reminder of how fragile a
flower is intellectual freedom. Lester's colleagues have criticized him and
mocked him and now, finally, banished him: since the publication of
Lovesong, Julius Lester has been drummed out of the university's Afro-
American Studies Department, tenure or not. The final break came when
he wrote in Lovesong what he evidently had already said in private about
a campus lecture by James Baldwin: "I know that he is not an anti-
Semite, but his remarks in class were anti-Semitic, and he does not realize
it."78 For his colleagues, this was the final, back-breaking straw. They
issued a statement sharply disputing his comments about Baldwin.79 They
78. P. 210.
79. His colleagues were obviously sensitive to the charge that they were infringing Lester's aca-
demic freedom, so they worded their statement with care: "While Prof. Lester has the right to pub-
licly characterize James Baldwin in any way that he might desire, the actual results can only be
depicted as capricious, irresponsible and damaging in a most pernicious way." Quoted in L.A. Times,
July 10, 1988.
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J.L. & Human. 344 1988-1989
344 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 1: 317
demanded that Lester leave their ranks. He did so, moving to the Judaic
and Near Eastern Studies Department, where he now teaches.
Since Lester's departure, his colleagues have lambasted him publicly as
"self-serving and devious" and engaging in "adolescent exhibitionism,"80
and have further suggested that he is hostile toward other black people.81
Reading his book, written before his exile but after the handwriting was
on the wall, it is plain that Lester, at least, will never be convinced that
the colleagues who tortured him were untouched in their motivations by
any breath of anti-Semitism. I suspect that their motivations were a good
deal more complex than he paints them, but there can be little doubt that
they disliked him intensely, and that a part of the reason for it was the
views that he expressed. The thundering silence with which prominent
figures in the black community (with some notable exceptions, such as
Derrick Bell and the late Clarence Pendleton) have met Lester's mistreat-
ment itself speaks volumes, if not, perhaps, about prejudice, then at least
about willingness to tolerate dissent.
Tragically, but perhaps understandably, the black community is one in
which dissent is stifled. Evidently, a good deal turns on solidarity, on not
revealing to the world that some black people who have thought deeply
about the problems facing our community disagree with the consensus po-
sition on both the causes and the cures of the problems that bedevil our
people. The label that is applied to the dissenters is "black conserva-
tives"-as though the spirit of intellectual independence that leads critics
to dissenting positions can be defeated if it is reduced to an insult. For
make no mistake: the vision of much of the established black leadership
has sufficiently diverged from the vision of most of the American people
that "conservative" is thought to describe something unwholesome.
Plainly, there is no reason that the views of the black leadership, or of
black people generally, need be closely congruent to those held by others.
Freedom to think, freedom to criticize, freedom to be different are at the
heart of the American enterprise. In fact, a black leadership that stands to
the left of the country as a whole can provide an important service, for it
is vitally important that sensitive, thoughtful criticism come from every
corner. After all, if no one points out our flaws, they might go forever
unnoticed and thus forever uncorrected. And if the cost of that free criti-
80. See L.A. Times, July 10, 1988.
81. One of his colleagues in the department, responding to a question about anti-Semitism, ex-
plained: "We have nothing against Judaism, but when one develops a vicious attitude towards blacks
and black organizations, [Jesse] Jackson, [James] Baldwin, and civil rights there is some question of
the appropriateness of his remaining in the department." N.Y. Times, July 12, 1988. Another asked,
"Why is a black studies department under any obligation to give its imprimatur to someone who can't
seem to avoid stereotypical attacks on the black community? What is wrong with asking such a person
to find some other academic identity from which to attack black people?" Boston Globe, June 12,
1988. A third voiced a procedural complaint: "There is a very subtle, but very clear question of
responsibility and professional principle as far as black people are concerned. When I have to be
critical of the black community, I find a black journal in which to do it." L.A. Times, July 10,1988.
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cism is that some things will be labeled flaws that are not, the cost is
surely one that any free society must be willing to pay.
The mistake is in thinking that because a position represents a consen-
sus, questioning that position is like a crime and dissenting from it is high
treason. Unfortunately, in their anger at the dissenters, some influential
figures in the black community-people for whom I have the highest re-
spect-have strayed close to or over the line between pointed rebuttal and
personal attack. Black people who have come to reject the consensus of the
black leadership are excoriated, often through the use of terms to which
white dissenters would never be subjected. The unpardonable abuse of
Julius Lester is but one example. Another is the assertion by the head of
one major civil rights organization that the views of Glenn Loury are
"treasonous."82 And then there is this comment on Thomas Sowell, from
a distinguished black journalist:
Okay, Sowell has a right to be a conservative and to articulate far-
right views. But I must exercise my right to say that Vidkun Quis-
ling, in his collaboration with the Nazis, surely did not do as much
damage to the Norwegians as Sowell is doing to the most helpless of
black Americans. Sowell is giving aid and comfort to America's rac-
ists and to those who, in the name of conservatism and frugality, are
taking food out of the mouths of black children, consigning hundreds
of thousands of black teenagers to joblessness and hopelessness.83
Other critics suggest ulterior motives for the dissenters: "Neoconservative
analysts like Glenn Loury address these issues for their own Reaganite
public policy purposes."84 And then there is simple name-calling, as when
the late Clarence Pendleton, during his term as head of the Civil Rights
Commission, spoke at Yale Law School, and some of the posters announc-
ing his address were defaced with the epithets "Oreo" and "Uncle Tom,"
82. Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, quoted in Time, Nov. 11, 1985. Hooks' choice of words was especially tragic, given
the force of the rest of his remarks, for he went on to say: "It's always strange to me that somebody
with a Ph.D. cannot understand that this organization was designed to eradicate racial discrimination.
To say we should stop talking about civil rights is ludicrous."
83. Carl Rowan, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1981.
84. Martin Kilson, Letter to the Editor, New Republic, Nov. 11, 1985, at 6. It bears mentioning
that Loury himself has been similarly intemperate on the subject, albeit, perhaps, with provocation.
Thus, responding to the bizarre claim by Walter Williams that "most people in U.S. soup kitchens
have a few coins in their jeans they'd rather keep for items not handed out free-like wine, dope or
cigarettes," Loury expressed his "surprise and disbelief," complained that the assertion was made
"without any data," and then went on to say this:
I think the liberal press is partly responsible for the phenomenon which is Walter Williams.
If Ralph D'Arge were to have said the same thing, no one would be able to read about it in
USA Today, because D'Arge (obviously an arbitrary choice) is white, about as well respected
in the economics profession as Williams, but not of an "interesting" racial group. It is absurd
that Williams' views, as inane as they sometimes are, should be so widely considered, simply
because the man is a black economist. Applying the notion of affirmative action to the press
coverage of conservative economists is surely an instance of taking a good idea a bit too far!
Loury, Hunger and Politics, Business and Society Review, Spring 1984, at 60, 61.
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references, evidently, to his rather mainstream political stance in opposi-
tion to racial preferences.86 Both these epithets implicitly accept the case
for difference, for what stands behind them is the belief that one who is
"truly" black would surely not take what is thought to be the "white"
position.8s
I do not mean to suggest that the evidence is all one way. The National
Urban League, for example, invited Glenn Loury to address its conven-
tion, and several organizations have sponsored debates between the "con-
servatives" and figures whose views are closer to the orthodoxy. Still, the
ungentle truth remains that all too often, black people who dissent from
the orthodoxy of what remains of the movement are silenced by ad
hominem criticism from the black community itself. The critics are obvi-
ously angry at the dissenters, and their anger stems from a deeply felt
worry about the consequences of the dissent. It is not simply that they
believe the dissenters to be wrong; it is that in an era when much ortho-
doxy is under siege, they consider the dissenters' views to be terribly dam-
aging. The source of the anger is less the dissenters' positions than the
color of their skins. The point seems to be that black dissenters are dan-
gerous, because there are in this world people who are racists and who
would willingly use the dissenters' views against the black community.
But that claim, even if true, is beside the point, for if there were no
black dissenters, a true racist would simply use something else. Free
thinking, moreover, is not treason; on the contrary, it is the greatest ser-
vice that individuals can perform for their communities. Our commu-
nity-the black community-needs dissent, it needs dialogue, it needs all
the fresh ideas that it can get. But the message of the criticism of Loury
and Sowell and the rest is that dissent cannot be tolerated because the
risks are too great. It is as though our responsibility as people who are
black is to decline the invitation offered by our education, that is, the invi-
tation to think for ourselves.87
It would, however, be a tragic rejection of our history as a people were
those of us who choose to dissent to content ourselves with silence. The
battle for the right to read, the right to learn, the right to question and to
think and to understand and to challenge has been fought at far too great
a cost for us now to pretend that what the struggle was really about was
not our right to choose for ourselves, but rather to have a black orthodoxy
85. See supra note 46 (citing polling data).
86. To my astonishment, this incident of vandalism provoked considerable debate within the law
school, among students and faculty alike, over whether the defacing was outrageous or not and, stran-
ger still, whether "Oreo" and "Uncle Tom" are racial epithets or not. Evidently, the politics of the
name-callee often determine the wrongfulness of the name-caller.
87. As Glenn Loury has put the point: "I've got to have the freedom to go where my intellect
leads me, in view of the opportunities the civil rights struggle made possible." Quoted in Christian
Science Monitor, March 27, 1987.
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rather than a white one imposed upon us. We of all people ought to un-
derstand the costs of silencing independent voices.
But trying to silence dissent is nothing new for us. I often wonder
whether the silencers are aware of how often the same technique has been
used by leaders of the black community to silence the voices that today's
silencers and name-callers would no doubt consider progressive. For while
there is a tradition of black intellectual dissent, there is no tradition of
black intellectual tolerance; our history as a people has been to cast out
those whose views make us uncomfortable, and to reject their views not on
the merits, but on the insubstantial bases that the dissenter does not speak
for black people (as though that is the intellectual's goal) or that the dis-
senter is a tool of white people (as though no black person would, un-
aided, come to the dissenting position).
The argument that dissenters from orthodoxy do not speak for the black
community is an old and vicious form of silencing. It was used to tragic
effect in the age when Booker T. Washington was the only black intellec-
tual whose views mattered. In the early years of the twentieth century, as
Washington laid out his program of industrial training for the black
masses and a postponement of'the fight for political and social rights,88 a
small number of black intellectuals slowly lined up against him. The op-
position, in turn, drove Washington himself into an anti-intellectual fer-
vor, and he railed against his black critics, who were, he said, "ignorant in
regard to the actual needs of the masses of colored people in the South
today," because "[t]hey know books but they do not know men."89 Writ-
ing in the Atlantic Monthly, he added contemptuously that "a large ele-
ment of the colored people at first interpreted freedom to mean freedom
from work with the hands."90
In his autobiography, W.E.B. DuBois, perhaps the greatest of black
intellectuals, reflected on what it was like to live and think and criticize in
the era of Washington's hegemony:
Things came to such a pass that when any Negro complained or
advocated a course of action, he was silenced with the remark that
Mr. Washington did not agree with this. Naturally the bumptious,
irritated, young black intelligentsia of the day declared: "I don't care
a damn what Booker Washington thinks. This is what I think, and I
have a right to think."91
This protest was no mere intellectual conceit. DuBois himself was ulti-
88. For Washington's own accounts of his program, see his three important books: Up From
Slavery (1903), The Story of My Life and Work (1901), and Working With the Hands (1904).
89. Quoted in S. Spencer, Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life 139-40
(1955).
90. Washington, The Fruits of Industrial Training, 92 Atlantic Monthly 453, 456 (1903).
91. W.E.B. DuBois, The Autobiography of W.E.B. DuBois 241 (1968) (emphasis in original).
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mately forced from his teaching position at Atlanta University largely be-
cause his continuing opposition to Booker T. Washington's program was
hurting the school's fund-raising. Nor was he the only black intellectual of
the era forced to choose between tempering his views and continuing his
employment.92
There are other sad moments in our intellectual history when black
dissenters from orthodoxy were routinely silenced. Prominent examples
are the Harlem Renaissance between the world wars, when an artist or
writer simply had to be left to be in, and the Un-American Activities
investigations of the fifties, when leftist black intellectuals were virtually
expelled from the black mainstream. One would think that by now, we as
a people would have learned a lesson on the importance of permitting,
encouraging, even cherishing, critical thinking. But perhaps that is unfair:
the rest of the society has not yet learned to cherish intellectual diversity.
Why should we be any different?
One reason that we should be different is that in an era in which a
third of black people still live in poverty, when the inner cities are be-
sieged by drugs and crime, when so many of our children are themselves
having children, we cannot afford the luxury of insisting, in the name of
solidarity, that anyone of these problems has a single, unchallengeable
answer. Certainly it makes no sense to alienate some of the best minds
that we have-minds that include the Sowells and the Lourys and the
Wilsons and the Lesters. They dissent from the orthodoxy not because
they do not care about our problems, but because they have thought about
the problems and the orthodoxy alike; and thinking of better answers is
something we should not discourage. When we are told-and some among
the dissenters tell us frequently-that racial preferences tend to help those
black people who least need the assistance, and make little or no differ-
ence in the lives of the black underclass, we ought to listen to the evidence,
not bristle at the assertion. And if the evidence supports the assertion (and
it does),98 we ought to admit it, and perhaps rethink our own ideas.
And of course, we must be careful, for our need for these free-thinking
dissenters may prove to be greater than their need for us. The black "con-
servatives," so-called, are relatively comfortable in their academic sine-
cures, which is, after all, what academic sinecures are for. Despite the
name-calling of their critics, they will not be silenced. And they should
not be.
Looking at the deep rift between the dissenters and the mainstream, one
cannot help but think back on the Niagara Movement, a forerunner of the
NAACP, organized in 1905 by W.E.B. DuBois and other opponents of
92. See id. at 223-29. For an evocative account of the battle between Booker Washington and the
black intellectuals, see S. Fox, The Guardian of Boston: William Monroe Trotter (1970).
93. See W.J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public
Policy 109-18 (1987).
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Booker T. Washington in order to provide a platform for their dissenting
ideas and a base for their efforts to thwart Washington's ascendancy.
Washington, whose insistence on industrial training for the black masses
remained enormously popular in white America, still held most of the
black colleges and newspapers in a strangler's grip; the Niagara Move-
ment, as a platform for organized dissent, was intended to serve as a
counterweight.
Perhaps the time has come for a latter-day Niagara, for a new mani-
festo in which we who are black and choose to dissent might proclaim, in
much the same terms that DuBois used, our right to think for ourselves.
We must demand the right to comment on any subject, no matter how
sacred to the orthodoxy. We must worship no authority as absolute, ex-
cept for truth itself. We must, in short, do what intellectuals are supposed
to do: turn our critical and analytical faculties to the problems that seem
to us most important, and make up our own minds. We must say what we
think. That, at least, is what I think-and I have a right to think.
V. LOVESONG
And what of Julius Lester himself, vilified by members of the Afro-
American Studies Department at the University of Massachusetts at Am-
herst as an "anti-Negro Negro"?H Lester, it seems, has perhaps secured
his right to think, for the publication of Lovesong is itself a declaration of
independence. He has stated his views, and is willing to withstand the
criticism, and that in itself is a kind of victory over the pressure on the
black intellectual to avoid public dissent. So Lester stands triumphant, not
defeated; for his discovery of himself is spiritual, not material, and cer-
tainly not political. Lovesong is a victory of a sort that few of us enjoy in
our lives.
I do not want my praise to be misunderstood. Lovesong is not a perfect
book. I have already mentioned the fury that undergirds and occasionally
distorts the narrative. There are other things in the book as well that I
wish were not there. I am bothered, for example, by his denigration of a
student who led a demonstration over an issue that Lester thought more
complex than the student did.ell But the passage that most set me back on
first reading is this one:
May 1966. Lowndes County, Alabama. I go to the outhouse. It is
a three-sided tin structure without a roof, and a board over a deep
94. Stt N:Y. Times, April 29,1988; New Republic, June 27,1988, at 9. The charge that Julius
Lester is an "anti-Negro Negro" is ironically reminiscent of the 1903 charge by a supporter of Booker
T. Washington that W.E.B. DuBois was "half ashamed of being a Negro." Stt Lyman Abbott, in 74
The Outlook 214 (1903).
95. Stt p. 176 (" 'That son-of-a-bitch!' I exclaim to my wife. 'Well, at least I didn't give him an
A.' ").
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J.L. & Human. 350 1988-1989
350 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 1: 317
hole. I sit, the warm breeze soft on my exposed buttocks. In the
distance, a man plows a field. In the tree above me, birds chirp. I am
whole again, at peace and at One with God. Time drops away like
an oversized garment, and the poverty and the pain and the death all
around me vanish as if they had never been.
That is my most vivid memory of the Civil Rights Movement.Be
When first I read these words, I was annoyed. If Lester's most vivid
memory of the movement is a few minutes in an outhouse, I decided, he is
trivializing the struggle for freedom. But as with rising unease I returned
to the passage again and again, I found in it something quite different
from what I first read there. These lines conclude a brief essay in which
the mature Lester, thinking back on the civil rights movement, recalls that
even as his mind justified the struggle in which he was engaged, his soul
still yearned for something else, something more assuring than an act of
mind. The epiphany that the passage records resolved his conflict, and
thinking of his words that way, I discovered an affirmation that even at a
time of vital and united social action to combat an abominable oppression,
Julius Lester wanted, indeed needed, a moment's gentle solitude to pause
and meditate and refresh the spirit. I prefer to think that the importance
of the memory is not its conflation of outhouse and civil rights movement,
but its celebration of peace, of oneness with God. So now, each time I
read this passage, I am less troubled by it, for each time I read these
words, I feel more and more as though I know this man, as though he is
opening his heart and giving of himself-and what I learn about him is
that he loves solitude and loves God.
Love of solitude is essential to the character of the intellectual, for the
intellectual must be at heart a free thinker, unconcerned with the approval
or disapproval of others. The life of the intellectual is finally a lonely one,
not necessarily in the social sense, but in the sense of mind. A free thinker
is by nature not a follower, because the free thinker is always a critic; and
no life is so lonely as the life of one who refuses to be led. And when this
free-thinking intellectual puts pen to paper (or, nowadays, fingertips to
keyboard), when the intellectual says, "This is what I think," the loneli-
ness increases. For that is the point of no return; one's views are out there
to be analyzed, dissected, attacked, dismissed. The life of the intellectual is
no life for people with thin skin.
The point is that Lester does not need anyone's approval of what he
thinks and writes; certainly, he does not need mine. That is, in a sense,
the book's larger message, and even were his views pernicious-which
they certainly are not-I would have to admire him for his hardy forth-
rightness. For he well understands the costs of his dissent, which is why
Lester chooses these sad words to describe his state of mind after publish-
96. P. 41.
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ing "The Uses of Suffering" but before deciding to convert to Judaism, as
he reflects on what it is like to have one's people turn their backs:
I cannot rid myself of the desire to convert. Would I want to if I
were not so isolated from blacks now? I don't know. But I do feel
lonely and abandoned by my people. If I converted now, I'm afraid I
would be doing so only because I am angry at my own people. I
know that if Jews did not accept me, I would be devastated. I can
only become a Jew when I know that is what God wants of me, even
if no Jew in the world accepts me.
I doubt that Jews would accept me in my complexity any more
than blacks have. When Hannah Arendt published Eichmann in Je-
rusalem, she became a nonperson among Jews as I have among
blacks. Would Jews have responded any differently to a Jew who
defended the black response to Young's resignation than blacks have
to me? I don't think so.
I must accept that this loneliness is how God wants me to live.97
It is in the nature of the pure intellectual to be lonely and distrusted; it is
in the nature of the intellectual dissenter to be lonelier and more dis-
trusted still. Julius Lester has understood this for better than two decades;
what he perhaps has learned now, and did not know before, is the solu-
tion. The solution is to rename your loneliness, and through renaming it
to transform it into triumph.
That is why Lester stands triumphant. He needs no one else to perse-
vere; he needs himself, his faith, and his God. And has them all. For the
book's most splendid moment comes when a hesitant, uneasy Julius Les-
ter, having asked himself, "[I]f I do not become a Jew, who am I?"98 sits
in the synagogue at Yom Kippur, hears the cantor singing "Next year in
Jerusalem," and quite suddenly finds, in his own words, "I want to
dance, to spin around and around until I collapse in laughter and joy."99
It is plain from the tone of his book that Lester is not fully at peace; in
particular, there is no peace between him and the black leadership on
whom he heaps such abuse. And yet I have the sense that acts of contri-
tion, of mutual forgiveness and reconciliation, and of understanding, are
possible; certainly, they are desirable. For his concept of the universality
of suffering is one that we as black folk ought not to reject, but to em-
brace. We should welcome the possibility that our beauty and our impor-
tance is not in our collectivity but in our individuality, that we are impor- .
tant less for what we are a part of than for who we are. This notion
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senses of the word). And if our suffering is common, how can we be
special?
But then, Lester once more has seen something that most of us have
missed: "How like God to make the most beautiful things the common
ones. How human to see beauty only in the rare."lOO And that, finally, is
the flaw in creating special preferences on the premise of black unique-
ness. If we who are black are special, it is not because we have suffered
but because we have persevered. Because we are, all of us, the common
people, and therefore the beautiful ones; to think that we are special only
if we have been wronged is to see beauty only in the rare. Suffering is
everywhere, and it is because he understands this, and wants to love all
who suffer, love them for their commonness, and not for their beauty, that
Julius Lester is able to dance his dance of loving joy.
Ah, Julius, Julius, do not dance alone! Invite us to join you, let us
dance together, not because you are Jewish or because we are black, but
because we are all of us human and different and infinitely valuable in
our infinite diversity. Let us dance in the joy of our differentness; let us
dance because we are not the same.
100. P. 102.
